Plasma operation conditions and physics requirements to be used as a basis for safety analysis studies are developed and physics results motivated by safety considerations are presented for the ITER design. Physics guidelines and specifications for enveloping plasma dynamic events for Category I (operational event), Category 11 (likely event), and Category III (unlikely event) are characterized. Safety related physics areas that are considered are: (i) effect of plasma on machine and safety (disruptions, runaway electrons, fast plasma shutdown) and (ii) plasma response to ex-vessel LOCA from first wall providing a potential passive plasma shutdown due to Be evaporation. Physics models and expressions developed are implemented in safety analysis code (SAFALY, couples 0-D dynamic plasma model to thermal response of the invessel components). Results from SAFALY are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
is designed to operate with D-T plasma, producing 1.5 GW of fusion power for an ignited bum pulse durations of 1000 s or more. Because of the uncertainties in plasma physics and difficulties for simple robust/precise quantifications of safety related physics areas, the safety approach in ITER is to take minimum credit from plasma physics. However, it is necessary to address various plasma physics phenomena in safety analysis. These include: (i) disruptions (including vertical displacement events VDEs), (ii) runaway electrons, (iii) off normal fusion power and plasma shutdown, and (iv) fusion power transients. In this paper we present results from some of these areas as motivated by safety consideration.
The physics basis and design guidelines are developed from reasonable extrapolations of the tokamak database and guidance of tokamak theory. [1] [2] [3] In Sect. 11, we describe the physics guidelines and specifications for enveloping plasma dynamic events.45 Here, we classify these guidelines as nominal operational bound, rare but possible (very few, if any data points), and upper bound (no data points). In safety language, these may be labeled as Category I, 11, and 111 events, respectively. The basic physics models and equations developed here are implemented in a safety analysis code (SAFALY)~ to calculate anomaly sequences of fusion reactors initiated by plasma events. SAFALY code couples 0-D dynamic plasma model to the thermal response of the in-vessel components.6 The effect of plasma on machine and safety are discussed in Sect. 111. Here three examples are considered: disruptions, runaway electrons, and fast plasma shutdown. Results from analysis are presented and, when appropriate, mitigation techniques are discussed. The plasma response to F W LOCA and possibility for passive shutdown of plasma by Be evaporation are covered in Sect. IV.
II. PHYSICS GUIDELJNES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS
The main physics issues have been assessed by the ITER JCT, the Home Teams, and the ITER Physics Expert
Groups on the basis of data from present tokamak experiments. The physics basis and design guidelines are developed from reasonable extrapolations of this database and guidance of tokamak t h e~r y . l -~ The main plasma and device parameters (Table I) have been derived from the performance goals using these guidelines. The plasma operation conditions and physics requirements to be used as a basis for safety studies are further i n v e~t i g a t e d .~~~ A brief summary of these guidelines, related to enveloping plasma events for safety Category I (operational event), Category I1 (likely event), and Category I11 (unlikely event) are presented here.
n ANS/12th Topical Meeting on the Technology of Fusion Energy Table I . Nominal lTER device and plasma parameters to be used for safety analysis Units are mks, MA, MW, with KJ average values at 95% flux, and n20 = nd1020 m-3 = line-average electron density, T10 = (T/10 keV) = density-weighted average temperature (T = Te = Ti). Ai = average atomic mass.
H-mode profiles: n,T -(1 -r2/a2)an*T, with a, = 0.1 and aT = 1.0 as nominal values. Nominal ignited operating point: 1.5 GW, ne -1.3 x 1020 m-3, T -10.5 keV.
Confinement:
Plasma energy confinement must be sufficient to achieve ignition and sustained bum at fusion power of -1.5 GW, under empirical scalings for ELMy Hmode plasma energy confinement and corresponding He and impurity concentrations (Zeff -1.5, nDT/ne -0.6).
Reference assumptionslmodels are as follows:
Here HH = H-mode scale factor with respect to 0.85 times Density Limit: The density limit imposes an upper limit on the plasma edge density. The density limit in Lmode plasmas is generally disruptive, the limit in H-modes generally prompts a return to the L-mode and a disruption is not inevitable. In ITER, the return to L-mode will produce a fast decay of the fusion power, faster than the density decay, and a disruption will be highly probable in Greenwald density limit is n20GR = K J(MA/m2) = V(xa2). Note that the ITER nominal density [at 1500 MW ignited bum] is higher than the Greenwald limit (by -1.4-1.5 times--Cat I). In several experiments with pellet fueling (although in L-mode), it was possible to exceed the Greenwald limit by as much as a factor of 2 (to 3). However, ITER can not take credit for (2-3) x nGR because this is only possible transiently with deep, central pellet fueling resulting in a very peaked density profiles. In ITER (or in a reactor scale plasma), it is not possible to have a deep central fueling (unless the compact toroids are used for fueling and proven to be a viable option) to get peaked density profiles. At the present time, ITER is not using compact toroids for fueling, and pellet velocities is only around 1 km/s (pellet penetration is only at the edge).
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A tentative characterization of the Borrass density limit adapted for a single-null divertor configuration of ITER is:2 n20 = (ne/nes) c [QL"8B"'6(1 -fraddiv)* 1'16/(q~R) 1/16] where ne, = plasma electron density at the separatrix, Ql(MW/m2) = mean power flux crossing the separatrix, fmddiV = P,addiv/(41c2RaKo,5Q~) is the divertor impurity radiative fraction, q = qv(95%), and C = 2.37. The value of nes/ne (-0.4-05) depends on particle transport and fueling at the plasma periphery. For physics-safety studies, because the plasma startup and nominal plasma operation are not safety issues, it is reasonable to assume that ITER plasma reaches H-mode instantaneously, without any consideration of the L-H power threshold. Alternatively, it may be more realistic to consider the following [one-half of minimum value]: 
H-mode
--transition: PH-L -0.5 x PL-H. For nominal ITER parameters, PH-L (MW) -150 x n20 [about 180 MW at n20 -1.2,
T, K)
The plasma impurity concentration and erosion/ evaporation etc. from the wall or the divertor platedtargets are related through a complicated transport process, involving ionization of the atoms, their streaming along magnetic field lines, and their diffusion perpendicular to the field lines. From experimental result^,^^^^ we find that a probability of an Be atom produced at the wall to penetrate into the main plasma is in the range of 0.1 -to-0.01 [i.e., 1 in 10 to 1 in 100 atoms are transported into the plasma]. A similar probability for Be atom produced at the divertor neutralizer plate to penetrate into the main plasma is in the range of 10-2-to-10-3.[i.e., 1 in 100 to 1 in 1000 are transported into the plasma].
III. DISRUPTIONS, RUNAWAY ELECTRONS AND FAST PLASMA SHUTDOWN A. Disruption and VDEs
Disruptions of ITER plasmas containing -1 GJ of both thermal and magnetic energy (Table I) produce large forces and stresses on all in-vessel components and are the determining factor in their structural design. The design must allow for the thermal and electromagnetic loading effects of major disruptions and the vertical displacement events (VDEs) that will follow these disruptions. Disruptions can be grouped into three classes:2 Case 1-'Radial Disruption', involving a rapid thermal quench (-1-10 ms) followed by a rapid current quench (10-25 ms); Case 11-'Vertical Disruption', involving a rapid thermal quench (-1-10 ms) followed by a slow current quench (25-300 ms), with an associated vertical drift phase (VDE); and Case 111-'VDE, involving an initial slow vertical drift phase and onset of plasma-wall contact (50-500 ms)
followed by onset of a disruption and/or rapid loss of remaining plasma thermal energy, beginning when a plasma edge safety factor of -1.5 is reached. Both Case 11 and Case 111 will result in contact of the plasma with the first wall and the onset of appreciable (up to 8 MA) poloidal 'halo' currents in the in-vessel structures, resulting in Ihalo x B forces in the structures. To minimize the number of Case I1 and I11 disruptions, impurity pellets ('killer pellets') can be injected to convert them into Case I disruptions. Design basis specifications for VDEs and their associated halo currents are given in Fig. 1. In Fig. I displays the toroidal peaking factor vs halo current envelope for Cat I, 11, and events/load conditions. 
B. Runaway Electrons
The runaway electrons (Table V) produced during plasma disruption can cause a serious damage of the plasma facing components in ITER. The issue is whether the runaway electrons can cause (in one disruption) a damage to a large number (or all) of blanket modules and result in an accident accompanied with large rate of the water leak. In Table V , runaway heat load on the first wall is estimated under the assumption that plasma is moving vertically and sweeping the first wall (FW) over a short poloidal distance (-0.5 m). This estimation gives a typical but not the maximum possible heat load. If the plasma moves slowly and radially, touching the FW at the same poloidal position, the local heat load could be as high as 100 MJ/m2 and the total energy of runaway electron is sufficient to melt a narrow ditch along toroidal direction in all blanket modules with the depth about 1 cm. However, this is only possible if the first walVblanket modules are perfectly aligned in toroidal direction. VDE time)
Note that heat loads of 30-40 MJ/m2 can be reached only at very small a's. The probability that more than 10 modules will be wetted by runaway electrons is very low p < 1F6. Although the safety credit can not be taken for random misalignment, it is possible to make a deliberate first wall modulation in toroidal direction (by placing a few blanket modules by -3-5 cm closer to the plasma then the rest of them) to avoid accident with all blanket modules.
C. Fast Plasma Shutdown--Killer Pellets
The requirements for the fast shutdown system for ITER is given in Table VI . An important application of the ITER fast shutdown system is mitigation of plasma disruptions. Injection of impurities ('killer pellets') was proposed as a candidate for the fast plasma shutdown in ITER.I.2 Impurity radiation can provide the required termination time and distribute the plasma thermal and magnetic energy over the large first wall surface area. Modeling (see ref. 12) of the fast termination of the ITER plasma shows that impurity pellet injection can remove the plasma thermal energy and reduce the plasma current sufficiently during the required time. However, the presence of high-Z impurities in the plasma leads to the formation of large runaway currents (50-75% of initial current) --potentially dangerous for the first wall. An possible solution may be massive injection of a low-2 (D or He) which makes the plasma less susceptible to runaway formation and at the same time can provide the required termination times --required amount of D is 20-100 g. Plasma response has been investigated using various methods and models, ranging from use of simple estimate^,^.^^ to consideration of diffusion models ( B o b and neoclassical diffusion),14 to use of hybrid code SAFALY.6 From a simple analysis, one needs the following for plasma termination in ITER:~ Required evaporation flux atomslm2/s) is equivalent to needed evaporation rate of -340 d y e a r , corresponding to first wall temperature of more than 1ooo'C. Similar results13 are summarized in Fig. 3 . Figure 3 : Beryllium concentration inside the plasma due to evaporation of beryllium. Assumed F W area is 300 m2. R is the fraction of evaporated beryllium atoms that are transported into the core plasma. The residence time of a Be atom inside the plasma was assumed as 5 seconds.
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Results from Fig. 3 indicate that passive plasma shutdown appears possible in the temperature range of 1050 to 1300°C for R values in the range of lo-* to IO4 (fraction of evaporated Be atoms transported into the core plasma). It will be difficult to limit F W temperatures <1OOO' C.
Note that the evaporated Be are ionized in the scrape off layer (SOL) plasma and most of Be ions are swept into the divertor chamber, while a small portion diffuses into the core plasma. The estimated ionization and radiation losses by Be in the SOL and the energy lost to the divertor exceeds the alpha heating power (300MW) when the SOL temperature is greater than 20 eV.XX Energy losses in the SOL will result in radiation collapse (disruption), andor loss of H-mode (return to L-mode).
Plasma response to ex-vessel LOCA in the first wall (FW) cooling system is also investigated using a hybrid code, SAFALY. SAFALY treats the interaction of the plasma with plasma facing components (PFCs). The initial conditions in the simulations were: r*-. In the calculation, no bum control is imposed (fueling rate keeps the steady state) and the LOCA occurs at 1 s after the simulation starts. Time evolution of plasma and structure parameters are displayed in Figs. 4 and 5. The plasma is terminated passively at about 180 s after the LOCA by a combination of density limit disruption and power balance failure, Fig. 4 . At about 150 s, the surface temperature is about 9 W C (Fig. 5 ) and Be concentration in the plasma start to become significant [Fig. 4) . Here, the time delay of impurity retention by the energy condiment time is assumed. The surface temperature just before the disruption is about 11WC and the coolant tube temperature is about the same. The coolant tube of FW is made by SS316 and the tube will not melt at the temperatures shown in Fig.5 (-lO0O'C). But, Copper is used as a heat sink at around the tube, so the heat sink could melt. During the accident, the surface temperature of divertor also increases due to radiation increase from Fw, but it is not as serious. As to divertor LOCA, maybe, we can not expect the passive shutdown, because the EDA reference adopts W and CFC as PFC material of the divertor.
